دانلود ترجمه مقاله لاتین External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements

ترجمه فارسی مقاله لاتین External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements در قالب فایل ورد و در 55 صفحه همراه با اصل مقاله لاتین آماده شده است.   این مقاله توسط مترجمان حرفه ای و به صورت مفهومی ترجمه شده است. کیفیت ترجمه تضمین شده است.

Abstract: In a game of endogenous trade agreements between three countries, we show that while the pursuit of customs unions (CUs) prevents global free trade from emerging as a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) does not. This result refl?ects the relatively ?exible nature of FTAs: whereas each FTA member can independently undertake further trade liberalization with respect to the non-member, CU members must do so as a group due to their common external tariff. By diverting members?exports away from the non-member, both types of trade agreements induce the non-member to voluntarily lower its import tariffs.